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Riede: Pregnancy Discrimination, Women's Law Forum

COMMENT

EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF PREGNANCY: RIGHTING THE
POWER IMBALANCE

I. INTRODUCTION

When a working woman decides to have a child, recent
laws allow her to take time off from work to give birth and
raise the child for a specified time. Laws also exist that prohibit gender discrimination in employment. Although these
laws are a stride toward creating an equitable employment
environment between men and women, they do not adequately
address the legal problems a woman faces when she asserts
her right to take maternity leave.
When a woman exercises her legal right to take maternity
leave, she often returns to a hostile environment, or returns to
find out that her job no longer exists as Smith v. F. W. Morse,
. Co., Inc demonstrates. l The position-elimination defense to a
Title VII claim undermines Title VII's protections against employment discrimination of women who take maternity leave. 2
Although women have come a long way in their fight for equal
rights, the end of the road is distant as long as this defense
remains too broad and the plaintiffs burden remains too
high.3
1. See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 418-419 (lst Cir. 1996) (per
Selya J., concurring Bownes, J.).
2. See infra part IV.B.
3. Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies in the United States
and the European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal
Values? 12 COMPo LAB. L.J. 458, 465 (1991).
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In Smith v. F. W. Morse & Co. ,4 the First Circuit Court of
Appeal refused to protect the plaintiff from discrimination
based upon her pregnancy. Smith was terminated upon returning from maternity leave and her employer claimed that
Smith's job had become superfluous because the company reorganized during her absence. 5 The Smith court denied Smith's
claims of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, "Title VII,,).6 Although United
States Supreme Court precedent sets out two burden shifting
frameworks for analyzing such cases, the Smith court blatantly
circumvented that precedent in its decision. 7 While failing to
recognize the difficulty of Smith's evidentiary burden, the court
found that Smith did not present a prima facie case of discrimination based upon pregnancy. The court instead concluded
that Smith's employer, F.W. Morse, presented sufficient evidence under the position-elimination defense to support a finding that, regardless of Smith's pregnancy leave, her position no
longer existed after Morse's reorganization. 8
First, this comment will examine the problems with the
position-elimination defense as illustrated by Smith v. F. W.
Morse & Co. 9 Since some reorganization is necessary when an
employee takes leave, allowing an employer to offer this reorganization effort as evidence of non-discriminatory intent creates a gap in Title VII protections. lO Next, the author will
compare existing American federal family leave laws and European leave laws. 11 The comment will then use California's
landlord-tenant law as a prototype for proposing an amendment to existing maternity leave law that remedies the power
distribution between dominant and subordinate individuals in
a legal relationship. 12

4. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413 (lst Cir. 1996).
5. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418-419.
6. Id.
7. See infra parts ILA. & IV.A.
8. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422-425.
9. See infra parts III, IV.A-B.
10. See infra note 87; see infra part V. When any employee cannot be at work
for a prolonged period of time, an employer is forced to reorganize in order to
make sure that the employee's work is completed.
11. See infra part V.B.
12. See infra part V.C.
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The author will recommend expanding the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (hereinafter IFMLA")13 to include a
180 day mandatory time period during which a returning
mother's position is guaranteed which would more adequately
equalize the power imbalance between an employer and employee. 14 This proposed amendment would have the effect of
protecting a woman returning from maternity leave from termination based upon her employer's putative retaliation. 15
Finally, this comment will address the legal ramifications of
expanding the protections set out in the FMLA.16 Since it is
impossible to completely prevent retaliatory dismissal from
occurring, the next best solution is to offer job protection for a
specified time period to the returning working woman. 17
II. BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII
A. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
If a plaintiff proceeds under a disparate impact theory, the
burden-shifting framework, or "process of inquiry," for proving
intentional discrimination will depend on the availability of
direct evidence. IS If direct evidence equivalent to a "smoking

13. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ensures up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave for a variety of purposes, including birth or adoption of a child. 29
U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West Supp. 1996). Examples of state laws that mandate maternity leave are: California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, a comprehensive
statute that inter alia requires an employer to provide female employees with
unpaid pregnancy disability leave for up to four months; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945
(Deering Supp. 1996), Montana's Maternity Leave Act, a comprehensive act that
inter alia provides that it is unlawful for an employer to deny a female employee
the right to take maternity leave for a reasonable amount of time, MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-2-310, 311 (1995); Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act, a
comprehensive act that guarantees maternity leave. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a60(a)(7) (Supp. 1985).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra part V.D.
17. See infra part V.
18. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420-21 & n.3. The events leading up to the Smith case
occurred before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub.L. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(c)(1)), established a right to trial by jury in Title VII cases. See also Fuller
v. Phillips, 67 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995), wherein the circuit court in a racial
discrimination context explained how the passage of "the Civil Rights Act of 1991
[also] modified the burden-shifting scheme in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
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gun" does not exist, the plaintiff must attempt to prove her
case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 19 If direct evidence of discriminatory motive does exist,
the plaintiff must apply the Price Waterhouse framework. 20

1. The McDonnell Douglas Framework - Indirect Evidence
Absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent, a plaintiff
must prove the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework
to make a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. The
plaintiff must show 1) that the plaintiff is pregnant (or has
indicated an intention to become pregnant), and 2) has sustained a satisfactory job performance, but 3) the employer
nonetheless dismissed her from her position while 4) continuing to have her duties performed by a comparably qualified
person. 21 A rebuttable presumption that discrimination induced the dismissal arises once the plaintiff has established
the four prima facie elements. 22 The burden then shifts to the
employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for
the dismissa1. 23 If the employer "clears this modest hurdle,"
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
employer's justification was a mere pretext for discrimination. 24

U.S. 228 (1989), making mixed-motive treatment more favorable to plaintiffs." See
also Fields v. Clark Univ., 966 F.2d 49, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1052 (1993) (discussing the relevant standards).
Although the definition of "direct evidence" is central to determining which
standard the court should apply, the court simply made repeated references to
"smoking gun" evidence without clearly defining what constitutes direct evidence of
gender discrimination. Direct evidence was defined in Jackson v. Harvard Univ.,
900 F.2d 18. 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that direct evidence can be defined
as evidence that shows a discriminatory animus). Direct evidence was also explained in the negative by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse as "excluding
stray remarks in the workplace statements by non-decision makers or statements
by decision unrelated to the decisional process itself." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring».
19. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
20. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
21. Id. at 421 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
22. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421.
23. Id.
24. Id. (The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout to show
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2. The Price Waterhouse Framework - Direct Evidence
If direct evidence of discriminatory intent does exist, the
Price Waterhouse framework applies. 25 Statements made by
an employer during a key decisional process can be direct evidence of discrimination. 26 Also, statements made outside of
the decisional process may fit the definition of direct evidence. 27 For example, post-discharge statements made by a
supervisor may constitute direct evidence of discrimination,
even though they did not reflect an express intent to discriminate. 28 In addition, statements made by an employer to third
parties may be direct evidence of discriminatory animus. 29
Under the Price Waterhouse framework, proof of direct evidence of discriminatory intent shifts the burden of persuasion
from employee to employer. 3o The employer then has the burden of affirmatively proving that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the pregnancy into account. 31
Direct evidence of discrimination alone was not enough to
impose Title VII liability on an employer in cases predating
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 32 Under today's
that a discriminatory motive was the reason for the dismissal).
25. Id. at 421 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258). This may be shown
if the plaintiff produces direct evidence that the protected characteristic was a
motivating factor in the employment action. For example, an admission by the
employer that it explicitly took anticipated pregnancy into account in reaching an
employment decision is direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Id.
26. Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449-50. (8th Cir. 1993)
(court referred to oral statements but later expanded its definition to include written statements which included corporate planning documents). See also Beshears v.
Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding statements during decisional
process that older employees have problems adapting to change and to new policies was sufficient direct evidence).
27. See Robinson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994)
(statements made in lunch room).
28. Id.
29. E.E.O.C. v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1099-1071 (11th Cir.
1990).
30. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 431 (Bownes, J., concurring). At the time that the events occurred
the law provided that an employer shown to have unlawfully discriminated could
avoid Title VII liability if, by a preponderance of the evidence, it is shown that
the adverse employment decision would have been the same even if discrimination
had played no role. Id.; see also Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1564-1565
(9th Cir. 1994). This is different under current applicable law. The Civil Rights
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applicable law, however, a plaintiff producing direct evidence
of discrimination under Price Waterhouse may have a Title VII
remedy.33
The United States Supreme Court set out the above alternative analytical processes for courts to follow in discrimination cases in order to remedy even the most subtle forms of
discrimination. 34 Courts must strictly adhere to this precedent
upon a claim of disparate impact in Title VII cases if the statutory protections are to truly help women fighting pregnancy
discrimination. 35
B. TITLE VII AND THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
Title VII provides, inter alia, that an employer shall not
discharge an employee based upon that individual's gender. 36
In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court held that a state disability insurance program could exclude certain disabilities

Act of 1991 modified the Price Waterhouse standard by making a mixed motives
case more favorable to plaintiffs. Section 107 of the Act provides that Title VII is
violated whenever an employer takes sex or pregnancy into account, regardless of
whether other considerations independently explain the adverse employment decision. 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 1994). Furthermore, where an employer in a
mixed motives case proves that it would have made the same decision, the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and declaratory and il\iunctive relief,
but not damages or reinstatement. Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, 69 F.3d 1205,
1210 (lst Cir. 1995) (citing 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (g)(2)(B) (West 1994)).
33. Smith, 76 F.3d at 431.
34. [d. at 430 (Bownes, J., concurring).
35. [d. ("The District Court's decision to circumvent the analytical processes
that the Supreme Court and Circuit precedent require should be criticized not
praised"); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 V.S. 248, 255
n.8 (1981).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, as amended, 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e (West
1994). Title VII enacted in 1964, in pertinent part states: "[iJt shall be unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, religion, sex or national origin." [d.
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibits discrimination in
employment. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12945 (Deering Supp. 1996). Wisconsin's Fair
Employment Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of maternity leave. WIS.
STAT. § 111.36 (Supp. 1996). Montana's Maternity Leave Act prohibits termination
based on a woman's pregnancy. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1995).
The first case in which the Supreme Court construed the provisions of Title
VII was Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 V.S. 542 (1971).
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from coverage. 37 In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart focused his analysis on comparable short-term disabilities. 3s
Justice Stewart concluded that the state could rationally distinguish between the excluded disabilities and the covered
disabilities based on the self-supporting nature of the program
and its low cost to employees. 39 In his dissent, Justice
Brennan emphasized how the exclusion of pregnancy created
one set of rules for males and another for females. 4O He pointed out that men are covered for prostatectomies, circumcision,
hemophilia and gout, which are all primarily male afllictions.41
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, however, the United States
Supreme Court decided that Title VII itself did not protect
against pregnancy discrimination. 42 In Gilbert, an employer's
disability plan included benefits for nonoccupational sickness
and accidents but excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy.43 The Supreme Court determined that this plan did not
involve gender discrimination. 44
This line of cases led to the amendment of Title VII to
included the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (hereinafter
"PDA,,)45 which set out to protect pregnant women from such
forms of gender discrimination. 46 Under Title VII as amended
37. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974).
38.ld.
39. ld.
40. ld. at 501.
41. ld.
42. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
43. ld. at 128-129.
44. ld. at 135.
45. The 1978 enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended
the definitional section of Title VII, providing in part that:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment - related purposes, including the receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in section 703(h) of this Title [42 U.S.CA §
2000e-2(h)] shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.CA § 2000e(k) (West 1994).
46. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. The PDA states the terms "because of sex" or "on
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by the PDA, an employee may proceed against an employer for
wrongful termination on the basis of grounds set out in the
PDA under either a disparate treatment theory or a disparate
impact theory.47 If the plaintiff chooses to assert a claim under a disparate treatment theory, she has the burden of proving that the employer purposefully terminated her because she
was pregnant. 48 Alternatively, a plaintiff may proceed under a
disparate impact theory if the employment practice is facially
neutral in its treatment of different groups but falls more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity.49
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kathy Smith began working for Damar Plastics & Metal
Fabricators, Inc. (hereinafter "Damar") in 1976 where she
advanced to the position of production manager. Damar operated a job shop where it crafted custom parts for high - technology applications. On December 23, 1988, Chris Bond became the new owner of F.W. Morse & Co. (hereinafter "Morse")
after purchasing Morse's interest in the company. 50 Then F.W.
Morse & Co. acquired Damar.
Bond decided that Damar, now known as Morse, had too
many managers. 51 Although Smith did not have a managerial
title most employees considered her to be a de facto manager
due to the inadequacies of the production control manager. 52

the basis of sex" include "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (k) (West 1994). Furthermore, it provides that
women affected by pregnancy, child birth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefits programs as other persons not so affected but similar in the
inability to work. [d.
47. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
575, 579-80 (1978).
48. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420.
49. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
50. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 1996),
51. [d. (The employees and their tasks included: Michael Hickman (production
control); Robert Lane (shipping); Ronald Paradis (production/machining); Marc
Shevenell (production/sheet metal); Gary Bickford (engineering); Michael Seeger
(sales); and Kathy Smith). [d.
52. [d. at 418.
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During Bond's reorganization efforts, he fIred both the production control manager and the shipping manager. 53 Bond then
promoted Smith to a newly created position of "materials manager.,,54 In addition to increased responsibility, Smith received
two raises in pay.55 As a result of this reorganization, Bond
claimed that the number of managers fell from seven to fIve. 56
Shortly after Bond acquired Damar, Smith informed him
that she was pregnant and intended to take maternity leave.
Throughout meetings with management before her maternity
leave, Smith was consistently told that her position with the
company was "secure" and that Morse would make only temporary adjustments during her maternity absence. 57 Before
Smith's maternity leave, management decided to distribute her
duties among the other supervisors and a newly hired secretary.58 Guimond additionally informed Smith that the termination of either the production/machining manager or the
production/sheet metal manager would most likely occur and
that Smith would once again receive a promotion upon her
return from maternity leave. 59 Also, Guimond informed her
that the engineering manager would most likely be demoted
and Smith would be asked to take on that responsibility.60
On April 7, 1989, Kathy Smith began her maternity leave,
planning to return to Morse after approximately six weeks. 61
Smith visited the plant on May 1, 1989 to inform her new
general manager, Maryann Guimond, that she wished to return to work one week earlier than originally anticipated. 62 At
this meeting Guimond asked if Smith desired more children, to

53. [d.
54. [d.
55. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418. (One of the raises took place in January and the
other in March. In total, Smith's weekly salary increased by approximately twentyfive percent).
56. [d.
57. [d.
58. [d.

59. [d.
60. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418. (Bond eliminated the engineering manager's position yet kept Gary Bickford with Morse in a lower position).
61. [d.
62. [d. at 419. (After the takeover, Guimond became the new general manager
at Morse.) [d. at 418.
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which Smith replied in the affirmative. 63 A few days after the
meeting, Guimond discussed with a co-worker Smith's personal
plans to have more children. 64
On May 11, 1989, although Guimond had assured Smith
repeatedly that her position was secure during her maternity
leave, Smith was terminated. 65 Ronald Paradis, the new operations manager, took on many of Smith's duties, while Marc
Shevenell assumed the role of manufacturing manager. 66
Guimond also promoted two low-ranking employees to assistant manager positions. 67 The secretary continued to maintain
the clerical functions associated with Smith's former position. 68 In total, after the second phase of reorganization,
Morse claimed that the plant had three second-echelon managers. 69
Shortly after her dismissal, Smith filed suit against Morse
in New Hampshire Superior Court alleging breach of contract,
wrongful discharge based on gender discrimination, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and discrimination based on
Title VII. 70 Morse removed the case to federal district court
based upon the Title VII claim. 71 The district court granted
Morse's motion for partial summary judgment on the common
law wrongful discharge and the emotional distress claims. 72 A
jury heard the breach of contract claim, but at the close of
Smith's case, the district court entered judgment as a matter of
63. [d. at 419.
64. [d. The co-worker with whom Guimond discussed this was Smith's sister,
Kathy Vendas. [d ..

65. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419. Guimond testified that the reason Smith was fired
was because her job had become superfluous during the reorganization. [d.
66. [d. at 419.
67. [d. (The court concluded that one of the two low-ranking employees had
been assistant manger as far back as 1984 and that neither man received salary
increases in connection with the new title).
68. [d.
69. [d. (Morse claimed that the managers and their duties were as follows:

Paradis (operations); Shevenell (manufacturing); and Seeger (sales). He also stated
that the seven original managers were replaced by three.)
70. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419.
71. [d. Title VII invokes federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §§
1331, 1343(a)(3), 1441, 1446 (West 1992, 1993, 1994); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §1367
(West 1993) (permitting ancillary jurisdiction over appended nonfederal claims).
72. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419. See Smith v F.W. Morse & Co., No. 90-361-S, slip
op. at 12 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 1991) (unpublished).
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law in Morse's favor on the breach of contract claim. 73
Several years later, the Title VII claim proceeded before
the federal district court, which held that the elimination of
the material manager's position and the ensuing dismissal of
Smith were both part of a valid reorganization effort to make
management more efficient. 74 Accordingly, the court concluded
that even if Smith had not been on maternity leave, her position would no longer exist after the reorganization. 75 Thus,
Morse could not be held liable under Title VII for Smith's dismissal and the district court entered judgment for Morse, from
which Smith filed this appea1. 76
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE VII CLAIM

A. THE COURT'S FAlLURE TO EMPLOY THE INITIAL PROCESS OF
INQUIRY IN SMITH'S TITLE VII CLAIM
Smith asserted that the district court erred when it decided that the totality of the evidence supported Morse's argument that gender discrimination did not trigger the firing.77
In Title VII cases, the court must engage in a preliminary
"process of inquiry" and determine which burden shifting
framework applies to the case at bar. 7s Rather than proceed
with the analytical steps set out by the United States Supreme
Court, the Smith court dismissed any inquiry into the direct
evidence of discriminatory intent as a "difficult theoretical
question.,,79 The court stated that "slavish insistence upon the
process for its own sake serves only to exalt the trappings of
justice over its substance."so By circumventing the initial process of inquiry, the district court resolved the Title VII claim
without ever deciding whether a prima facie case arose under
73. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419.
74. [d. at 420.
75. [d.
76. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420; see also, Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 901 F. Supp.
40, 45 (D.H.N. 1995).
77. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420.
78. [d. at 420-421; see supra parts II.A.1-2 for explanation of Price Waterhouse
and McDonnell Douglas frameworks.
79. [d. at 421.
80. [d. at 422.
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either the McDonnell Douglas or the Price Waterhouse framework. 81 Instead, the court proceeded directly to its analysis of
Morse's position-elimination defense.

B.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF MORSE'S POSITION-ELIMINATION
DEFENSE

Under the position-elimination defense to a Title VII
claim, an employer may eliminate a position during the course
of downsizing even if the position is held by members who are
protected by Title VII. 82 The employer may not, however, use
downsizing or streamlining as a pretext for dismissal when its
true motivation stems from a discriminatory animus. 83
The district court found that Morse sustained its burden
by showing that Smith's position would have been eliminated
regardless of whether the she became pregnant, took a maternity leave, or planned to bear more children. 84 The court decided that business judgment and economics unrelated to the
pregnancy guided Morse's reorganization decision. 85 The court
also determined that even if the court assumed that Guimond
considered Smith's pregnancy while making the decision to dismiss Smith, her position would have been eliminated anyway
due to the disproportionately high number of managers in the
company.86

81. Id.
82. Id. at 422.
83. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422. See also Quarantine v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58,
62-63 (2nd Cir. 1995). This case illustrates an employer's use of the reorganization
defense to a Title VII claim where an employee was told that her job would be
available to her when she returned from maternity leave. The employee was told
by her supervisor that she should stay at home with her child. When she wanted
to return to work she was informed that her job had been eliminated but she was
offered an inferior position. The employee found out later that her employer had
been interviewing replacements before she went on leave and after she informed
them of her intention to take the leave. Other female employees were given similar inferior positions, or were fired, when they returned from maternity leave. The
Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had cause to go forward with her Title VII
claim. Id.
84. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423.
85. Id. at 422 (citing Smith, 901 F. Supp. at 44).
86. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422.
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On appeal to the First Circuit, Smith asserted two arguments. 87 First, she argued that contrary to the district court's
finding, Morse did not in fact eliminate her position because
Morse had simply redistributed her work to other employees. 88 The appellate court held, however, that the positionelimination defense is not defeated simply because another employee, already on the payroll, is appointed to carry out some
or even all of the dismissed employee's tasks. 89 The elimination of a position does not necessarily mean "that the work the
employee had been doing was superfluous and need not be
performed at all.,,90 Rather, the employer most likely has determined that things can run smoothly with one less worker. 91
The appellate court agreed that Smith's position was eliminated in order to streamline the management team, which is
deemed a legitimate business decision rather than a discriminatory one. 92
Second, Smith argued that Title VII prohibited Morse from
dismissing her while she was on maternity leave even if he
discovered that her position was unnecessary from a business
standpoint. 93 Smith cited Bond's testimony that because
Smith was on' maternity leave, "Morse was able to discover
that her position was expendable. »94 In short, Smith argued
that Morse would not have realized the need to redistribute
the managerial duties had Smith not been on maternity leave;
hence, the leave brought about the firing.95
The First Circuit found that the district court applied the
appropriate legal standard. 96 An employer may discharge any
employee whether or not she is on maternity leave so long as it

87.
88.
89.
90.

[d. at 423.
[d.
[d.
[d.

91. [d.
92. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423. The court found no evidence to suggest that
Smith's fonner duties were taken over by Lupine or Hoffman and that the duties
of Paradis, Shevenell, and Gilday were perfonned during Smith's leave continued
to be perfonned by them after her dismissal. [d at 424.
93. [d. at 424.
94. [d.

95. [d.
96. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425.
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does so for legitimate reasons unrelated to her pregnancy.97
Title VII does not confer total immunity from dismissal during
maternity leave. 98 According to the majority, although Title
VII mandates that an employer put aside an employee's pregnancy while making employment decisions, it does not require
that employers ignore that employee's absence. 99 The PDA
does not force an employer "to pretend that absent employees
are present whenever the cause of their absences is pregnancy."lOO Title VII, as amended by the PDA, does not preclude
an employer from articulating legitimate reasons for terminating a woman while she is on maternity leave. lOl Title VII is
neither a "shield against this broad spectrum of employer accusations nor a statutory guaranty of full employment."lo2
Under this standard, the First Circuit found that the evidence adequately supported the district court's fact finding
that Smith's dismissal was not motivated by Smith's pregnancy, maternity leave, or desire to bear more children. 103 The
First Circuit cited several reasons supporting the district
97. [d. at 424.
98. [d. This case was brought under Title VII; had it been brought under the

recently enacted Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107
Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654) (West Supp. 1996), Smith
would have been more adequately protected under the 12-week mandatory leave
provision. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425, n.8. See infra note 165.
99. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425 (citing Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d
734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
100. Smith, 76 F.3d at 424-425 (citing to Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Systems Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. III. 1993». A coincidence between the
trait and the employment decision creates only an inference of discriminatory intent which is not enough to give rise to a per se violation of the statute. Smith,
76 F.3d at 425 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (l993».
101. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425 (citing Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.
Supp. 1199, 1204 (D. Utah 1986».
102. Smith, 76 F.3d at 425.
103. [d. at 422, 429. The Court of Appeals has the ability to overturn a decision made by the District Court with regard to fact-finding if the body of evidence
leads to the irresistible conclusion that a mistake was made by that court. Smith
v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 1996). This "clearly erroneous"
standard extends not only to fact finding but also to inferences drawn from the
underlying facts. See Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (lst
Cir. 1990). Appellate review does not reach fmdings regarding an actor's motivations if the trial court's reading of the record is plausible. Smith, 76 F.3d at 420.
See Foster v Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56-57 (lst Cir. 1995) (holding that findings regarding an actor's motivation fall within the shelter of Rule 52(a), and, therefore,
if the trial court's reading of the record on such an issue is plausible, appellate
review is at an end. See also, FED. R. ClY. P. 52(a).
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court's decision. 104 First, the testimony and all supporting
evidence supported the argument that the position was expendable. l05 Second, any other elimination decision would entail a loss of engineering expertise because many of the other
employees had an engineering background. 106 Third,
Guimond gave Smith increases in pay and new significant
responsibilities, while dismissing other managers. 107 The
court found that Morse's treatment of Smith was inconsistent
with a bias against pregnant employees. 108
The First Circuit also pointed out that the trier of fact has
the right to credit certain testimony and discredit other testimony.l09 In this case, the district court chose to credit Bond's
testimony that the maternity leave never played a role in
Smith's dismissal because the position would no longer have
existed due to the reorganization. llo The district court also
credited Guimond and Bond's testimony that Damar's organization structure defied logic. l l l Since two permissible views of
the evidence existed, the district court had no room to find
error with the fact finder's choice between them. l12 The First
Circuit upheld the district court's decision, 113 acknowledging
that the Title VII claim presented a close question, but because
the standard of review is generous, there was enough evidence
to support the district court's findings. 114
C.

THE CONCURRENCE

In his concurrence, Justice Bownes found fault with the
majority's analysis of the Title VII claim. 1l5 Justice Bownes

104. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Smith, 76 F.3d at 423.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 422.
112. Id. at 423 (citing Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1138 (1st
Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985».
113. Smith, 76 F.3d at 422.
114. Id.
115. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 429 (1st Cir. 1996) (Bownes, J.,
concurring).
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disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the causation
requirement under Title VII, and with Morse's position-elimination defense. u6 Justice Bownes observed that the
majority's interpretation failed to remedy "discrimination
against women who take or plan to take maternity leave."117
Justice Bownes found that the district court and the majority did not proceed with the "process of inquiry" required by
a showing of direct evidence under Title VII case law. us
Bownes believed that Smith produced enough direct evidence
at the outset to trigger the Price Waterhouse analysis. U9 In
addition, even if the majority rejected the usage of the Price
Waterhouse standard, it is irrefutable that Smith established
the prima facie elements of the McDonnell Douglas standard. 120 Therefore, Bownes sharply criticized the majority's
affirmation of the district court's failure to proceed under either framework. 121
Although Bownes disagreed with the majority's analysis in
its failure to apply either the Price Waterhouse or the
McDonnell Douglas standard, he found that the holding was
not clearly erroneous under current case law. 122 Bownes stated that the precedent in this area of law imposes too heavy a
burden on plaintiffs trying to prove that the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of a Title VII-protected
trait. 123

1. Direct Evidence and the Price Waterhouse Framework
Bownes found that the statements made to Smith by people such as Guimond, who was solely responsible for Morse's
personnel decisions, qualified as direct evidence of discrimina-

116. [d. at 429.
117. [d. at 430.
118. [d. (Bownes, J., concurring). A court has the choice of analyzing under the
Price Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas standard in deciding discrimination cases
based upon the existence of direct evidence. See supra part II.A.1-2.
119. 1d. at 431.
120. Smith, 76 F.3d at 433.
121. [d. at 430.
122. [d. at 431.
123. [d. at 430.
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tory animus. 124 After repeated assurances of job security,
Guimond questioned another employee about Smith's future
childbearing plans and within two weeks of learning of Smith's
future plans, decided to terminate her. 125 Under the suggested definition, these facts show that the timing of the decision
to terminate Smith was suspicious and should have been analyzed under the Price Waterhouse framework. 126
2. The McDonnell Douglas framework
Bownes stated that even if the majority rejected Justice
O'Connor's definition of direct evidence thereby refusing to
apply the Price Waterhouse framework, Smith made out a
prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas standard. 127 To establish a prima facie case, the employee
must show that 1) she was directly asked of an intention to
become pregnant in the future, 2) she had a more than satisfactory job performance, 3) she has been given repeated assurance of job security, and 4) performance of the duties of the
dismissed individual by comparably qualified individuals continues after her dismissal. 128 Smith had been asked of her intention to have more children, she was an excellent manager,
she had been assured that her job would be waiting upon her
return, and her duties were distributed among other employees
during her absence. 129 With these facts, Bownes reasoned
that Smith met her burden under McDonnell Douglas;
therefore the district court should have analyzed the facts
under this framework before finding Smith's evidence of discrimination deficient. 130
3. Causation in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases
Under the disparate treatment theory, Smith had the

124. Smith, 76 F.3d at 432 (Bownes, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 153
(1st Cir. 1990».
129. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418, 433.
130. Id.
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burden of proving that Morse terminated her because of her
pregnancy.131 The majority concluded that the "coincidence"
between pregnancy leave and employment decisions by itself
did not meet this causation requirement. 132 Bownes found,
however, that this may be true in some cases but that the
"coincidence" in this case arguably proved intentional discrimination. 133 The majority's discussion ignored the difficulty
posed in these circumstances; that maternity leave gives an
employer the opportunity to discharge women who take it, or
who express an intention to have children. 134
Bownes reasoned that although Smith's position may have
been eliminated even if Morse had not considered Smith's
family plans, Smith herself may not have been fired. 135
Though Bond and Guimond discussed eliminating the materials manager's position, the record shows that they had every
intention of retaining Smith because of her excellent skills. 136
Bond actually testified that Smith would still be employed at
Morse had she not taken maternity leave. 137 Also, Guimond
was very concerned about the disruption that Smith's maternity leave would cause the company.138 Thus, Smith established
that her termination was in large part brought about by her
employer's consideration of her pregnancy and not merely
because a particular position was eliminated. 139 As pregnancy
laws do not fully shield plaintiffs from adverse employment
decisions, likewise business judgment or necessity should not
exempt employers from Title VII's limitations. 140
4. The Position-Elimination Defense

Bownes disagreed with the majority's broad interpretation
of the position-elimination defense. 141 Bownes contested the
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

[d. at 420.
[d.
[d.
[d.

Smith, 76 F.3d at 433 (Bownes, J., concurring).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 434.
Smith, 76 F.3d at 435.
[d. The majority implies that as long as a company is able to manage in
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majority's decision under this defense in two ways: first, he did
not agree that Morse in fact reduced the size of its management team, and second, he found fault in the majority's related
work requirement analysis under the First Circuit case Le
Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co. 142
First, Bownes did not find that Morse reduced the size of
its management but rather, that the majority miscalculated
the numbers. l43 The facts suggest that Morse merely reorganized his team by consolidating positions and eliminating titles
but not by decreasing the size of its management. l44 The majority failed to include Bond and Guimond in its final count, as
well as two assistant managerial positions, even though the
individuals holding those slots did have management titles. 145
Also, the majority erroneously included Smith in Damar's
original management team even though she never had a
manager's title. 146 If these corrections are made to the
majority's final count, the number rises back to seven. 147
Bownes did not agree that this evidence was enough to rebut a
claim of intentional discrimination in every case. l48 However,
since it was plausible for the district court to interpret this
reorganization as position-elimination, Bownes concurred with
the majority's holding. 149
Second, Bownes stated that the period of inquiry for the
related work requirement should be before the maternity leave
in order to accurately assess the facts surrounding the dismissal. 150 Citing to Le Blanc, Bownes reasoned that an employee
cannot defeat the position-elimination defense by a claim that:

the absence of one of its key members, proof of a nondiscriminatory purpose exists. [d.
142. [d.; Le Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (lst Cir. 1993). An employee can meet the related work requirement by showing that plaintiff's duties
were shifted to employees already performing those or similar duties. [d. at 436.
143. Smith, 76 F.3d at 435 (Bownes, J., concurring).
144. [d.
145. [d. The majority found that Morse reduced its management team from
seven to three. [d.
146. [d.
147. Smith, 76 F.3d at 435 (Bownes, J., concurring).
148. [d.
149. [d.
150. [d. at 436.
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1) "an employee was only 'replaced' because 'another employee
[was] assigned to perform the plaintiff's duties in addition to
other duties,'" or 2) "'[because] the work was redistributed
among other existing employees already performing related
work.'" 151 Bownes contended that Morse's defense would fail
under the second Le Blanc scenario, unless Morse could prove
that it distributed the plaintiff's duties among employees who
were already performing some of those duties, or similar
duties. 152 Bownes found that during the second wave of reorganization, Smith's duties were actually transferred to employees who were not previously performing Smith's tasks or related tasks before Smith began her maternity leave. 153

If the court focuses on events that occurred during a
woman's maternity leave, it will almost always be true that
someone else will be performing their duties in order to compensate for that woman's temporary absence. 154 Thus, according to Bownes, under Le Blanc, the relevant period of inquiry
into whether the duties formerly performed by a plaintiff were
assumed by someone already performing related work should
be made before the leave begins. Otherwise, as in Smith, the
facts will consistently favor the employer under the related
work requirement. 155
V. RECOMMENDATION
The biological fact that only women have the ability to
bear children has been historically used to differentiate women
from men along social, psychological and emotional lines,156
and consequently, to justify their exclusion from the male public world. 157 Even now that some barriers are beginning to
break down, pregnancy discrimination remains an obstacle to

151. [d. at 435-36 (citing Le Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir.
1993».

Smith, 76 F.3d at 435-36.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 37 (1985).
157. [d.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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equal opportunity for women. ISS
Not until 1910 did more than twenty percent of the female population work outside the home, and most of those
women were single or widowed; today, women work outside the
home in approximately the same numbers as men. 1S9 During
1995, over four thousand women filed pregnancy discrimination complaints with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission, which constituted a 40% increase
since 1991. 160 Thus, the need to hone the laws that promote
women's freedom of choice to have a family while working is
more pressing than ever before. Though Title VII and the
FMLA were strong strides toward eliminating the imbalance in
the employer-employee relationship, the legislature must expand the scope of their protection even more by mandating
that a woman is guaranteed her position for a specified time
once she returns from maternity leave.
A. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993

A woman has the right to take maternity leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (hereinafter, "FMLA,,).161 Covered employees are entitled to take up to twelve work weeks of
unpaid leave during any twelve-month period in order to give
birth to a child or to care for a child. 162 During the period

158. [d.

159. Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies.[n The United States
and The European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal
Values? 12 COMPo LAB. L. J. 458, 459 (1990-1991).
160. Kelly King Alexander, Labor Pains: Pregnancy Can Be A Precarious Situation For Employee and Employer, 14 Bus. DATELINE; GREATER BATON ROUGE Bus.
REP., No.8; Sec 1; pg. 28 (Nov. 28, 1995).
161. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West Supp. 1996)
states in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Subject to section 2613 of this title, an eligible
employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the
following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the
employee or in order to care for such son or daughter.
[d.

162. [d. The act also covers leave for the care of a foster child, a family member with a serious health problem, or the employee's own serious health problem.
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that the employee is on leave, the employer must continue
paying the employee's health benefits. 163 In addition, the employer must, except under certain circumstances, reinstate the
employee to the same position or an equivalent position with
equivalent benefits, pay, and other conditions of employment. l64 Most employees remain uncovered fly the FMLA because it only pertains to employers with 50 or more employees
working within a seventy-five mile range and also exCludes
federal officers or employees. 165 Consequently, only five percent of American businesses are covered by the FMLA.166
[d.

163. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614 (c)(1) (West Supp. 1994) ("the employer shall maintain
coverage under any group health plan").
164. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1), (b)(l) (1994):
(a)(l) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
any eligible employee who takes leave under section 2612
of this title for the intended purpose of the leave shall be
entitled, on return from such leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the position
of employment held by the employee when the
leave commenced; or
(B) to be restored to an equivalent position with
equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other
terms and conditions of employment
(b)(l) [A]n employer may deny restoration under subsection (a) of this section to any eligible employee described
in paragraph (2) if,
(A) such denial is necessary to prevent substantial
and previous economic injury to the operation of the
employer;
(B) the employer notifies the employee of the intent
of the employer to deny restoration on such basis
at the time the employer determines that such injury would occur;
(C) in any case in which the leave has commenced,
the employee elects not to return to employment
after receiving such notice.
[d.
165. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1994) (enumerating the exclusions to the eligible employee in general).
166. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331, 351 (Winter 1995) (citing to Hearing on H.R. 1, The Family and Medical Leave Act Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1993) (statement of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of
Labor». See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1993) (enumerating
the conditions to be a statutory eligible employee). The FMLA covers employees
who have been employed for at least twelve months by the employer from whom
leave is requested and who have worked at least 1250 hours for the employer
during the previous twelve-month period. [d. Some states have enacted Family and
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Under Title VII, a woman who plans to take maternity
leave is protected from pregnancy discrimination. 167 The
FMLA provides that an employer must give maternity leave
for a specified time and offer the woman's job back to her when
she returns from her leave. 168 Should these safeguards fail,
the Court laid out 11 "process of inquiry" that courts must apply
when reviewing a Title VII action for sex discrimination. 169
Yet, even with these protections in place, Kathy Smith's employer escaped liability for discrimination against Smith based
on her pregnancy.
B. GERMAN FAMILY LEAVE

In order to strengthen pregnancy discrimination laws in
the United States a mandatory protection period should be
adopted similar to Germany family leave laws. Germany's laws
were used as a point of comparison during the FMLA legislative debates because Germany has the strongest economy in
the Western European countries. 170 In drafting its social legislation, the German lawmakers considered how the legislation
would affect families rather than focus on the effect on the
business sector.l7l As evinced by broader protection for pregnant women, Germany placed a higher priority on family than
economic factors when determining its leave laws. However, by
allowing the employer to assert the position-elimination
defense, the United States Congress appears more concerned
with the freedom of employers to make business decisions than
with adequately protecting pregnant women from discrimination.

Medical Leave policies that cover employers with fewer employees. See, e.g.,
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, covering employers with five or
more employees. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12945 (Deering Supp. 1996).
167. 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994).
168. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614 (West Supp. 1996).
169. See supra part II.A.1-2.
170. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 353.
171. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 344 (citing to Ronald
Brickman, et al., Controlling Chemicals 40 (1985» (stating that the "virtual neglect
of formal cost-benefit analysis in European decision making presents a striking
contrast" to the United States procedure).
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Currently, Germany has three laws that resemble the
FMLA in the United States: the Maternity Leave Act, the
Parental Leave and Support Act, and the Sick Leave Act. 172
The Maternity Leave Act now provides for job-guaranteed, paid
maternity leave. 173 The Parental Leave and Support Act provides for up to three years of job-secured parental leave. 174 By
offering "parental" leave, Germany shows that their laws
which were originally rooted in traditional gendered values,
now recognize modern breakdown of gendered roles in the
home and in parenting. 175 This law protects the employee
from termination; however, the employer may terminate the
employment relationship at the end of the leave, but only if the
employee receives notice three months prior to the termination. 176 The Sick Leave Act entitles an employee to paid
leave ,177 which is paid by the employer who is then reimbursed in part by its insurers.178

172. [d.
173. [d. at 335 (citing Mutterschutzgesetz MuSchG 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt
(BGBl.) I 1179 (Gennany). 20 Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at
345 (Although this law was initially passed to protect women workers from the
dangers of working while pregnant during the industrial revolution, in 1878, the
law has changed and now serves the purpose of providing leave to pregnant women and has lost its paternalistic intent).
174. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 335 (citing
Bundeserziehungsgeldesetz BErzGG 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1.) I 180 (Gennany).
175. Mona L. Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative Analysis With Germany, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. at 345. Originally providing
"mothers with the opportunity to extend the period of leave from work to six
months. Now the law's intent has changed to provide parents with a greater degree of choice in balancing the demands of work and family, thereby strengthening
their ability to raise their children properly." [d. By not mandating which parent
may take maternity leave, Gennany has demonstrated a more progressive and
realistic approach towards women's dual role in both the home and in the
workplace.
176. [d. at 349 '(citing to BErzGG sections 5(1), 18 (1)-(2), 19, 1994 BGBl. I 180
(Gennany».
177. [d. at 335. The original intent of the Sick Leave Act was to provide free
medical treatment while maintaining a percentage of the employee's pay during
the illness for a fIxed period of time. This is in stark contrast to the purposes of
the FMLA in the United States which includes balancing the demands of the
workplace with the needs of families, providing reasonable leave and promoting
equal employment opportunities, while accommodating legitimate employer interests as much as possible. [d. at 346-47.
178. [d. at 350-51.
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If the United States legislature intends to adequately
protect women from employment discrimination, its laws
should similarly place a higher priority on family relations
than purely on the employer's business freedom by amending
the FMLA to include a lBO-day mandatory protection period.
C. EXPANDING THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT TO
INCLUDE A 180 DAY JOB PROTECTION PERIOD

In most states, employment is presumed to be at-will
which allows an employer or employee to terminate employment at any time. 179 This. rule creates a problem when an
employer has a hidden discriminatory motive and knows that
the position-elimination defense may be easily asserted. Although both employer and employee have the power to terminate employment at any time, a power imbalance exists when
an employer terminates an employee because of a hidden discriminatory motive.
Some laws already compensate for such power imbalances
in other legal relationships, such as the California law that
protects tenants from retaliatory eviction when they file a complaint with the Housing Authority.1so In California Civil Code
Section 1942.5, a tenant has protection from a lessor's
retaliation for 180 days past the date upon which the tenant
files a formal complaint against the lessor with the appropriate
agency.1S1 The California legislature deemed 180 days suffi179. Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies In The United States
and The European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal
Values? 12 COMPo LAB. L.J. at 493 n.182. "The employment at-will doctrine is
traditional common law still in force today." Id.
180. See infra note 181.
181. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1996) provides in pertinent part:
(a) If the lessor retaliates against the lessee because of
the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter
or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as
to the tenantability of a dwelling, and if the lessee of a
dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his rent,
the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in
any action or proceeding, cause the lessee to quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services within
180 days:
(1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good
faith, has given notice pursuant to Section 1942, or has
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cient time to adequately ameliorate the problems that could
arise in such circumstances. In this way, the California legislature has remedied the effects of the power imbalance in the
landlord/tenant relationship when a tenant exercises her rights
under law. 182
Likewise, the 180 day mandatory protection period should
balance the power between the pregnant employee and her
employer. l83 A pregnant woman's only protection against discrimination is Title VII, which prohibits her employer from
firing her merely on the basis of her pregnancy or for some
reason that is really a guise for discrimination. l84 The Family
and Medical Leave Act states that an employee generally has
the right to return to the same position or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, benefits and working conditions at
the conclusion of the leave. 185 These provisions would be
made an oral complaint to the lessor regarding
tenantability; or
(2) After the date upon which the lessee. in good
faith. has filed a written complaint. or an oral complaint
which is registered or otherwise recorded in writing. with
an appropriate agency. of which other lessor has notice.
for the purpose of obtaining correction of a condition relating to tenantability; or
(3) After the date of an inspection of issuance of a
citation. resulting from a complaint described in paragraph (2) of which the lessor did not have notice; or
(4) After the filing of appropriate documents commencing a judicial or arbitration proceeding involving the
issue of tenability; or
(5) After entry of judgment or the signing of an
arbitration award. if any. when the judicial proceeding or
arbitration the issue of tenability is determined adversely
to the lessor.
In each instance. the 180-day period shall run from
the latest applicable date referred to in paragraphs (1) to
(5). inclusive.
(b) A lessee may not invoke the provisions of subdivision
(a) more than once in any 12-month period.
[d.

182. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (Tentative Draft
1969).
183. This is not to say that an employer is completely prohibited from terminating the employment of a woman returning from maternity leave. Obviously
certain exceptions exist which can be found in the employment contract of the
employee.
184. See supra note 36.
185. See supra part V.A.
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more effective were a similar mandatory time period added
during which the returning woman is guaranteed her position.
D. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF EXPANDING THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT TO INCLUDE A 180 DAY JOB PROTECTION PERIOD

Similar protection from an employer's retaliatory termination when a woman exercises her legal right to take maternity
leave must be integrated into the existing FMLA.186 An expansion to the FMLA would be placed after the clause: "An
employee generally has a right to return to the same position
or an equivalent position with equivalent pay, benefits and
working conditions at the conclusion of the leave. ,,187 The
clause would say in pertinent part, that an employer may not
terminate the employee returning from leave for 180 days past
the date that the employee returns from the leave.
This is not to say that an employer is completely barred
from terminating the employment of a woman returning from
maternity leave. Obviously, certain exceptions exist which can
be found in the employment contract of the employee. By providing an expansion to the FMLA analogous to California's
Remedies For Lessor's Retaliation, a woman would be better
protected from termination based on her maternity leave when
she returns to work.
Senator Williams, in favor of Title VII, as amended by the
PDA, stated that: "the entire thrust ... behind this legislation
is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the work force, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life. ,,188 The
author's proposal will fulfill this purpose by lowering the
plaintiff's burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework, by
raising the employer's burden under the Price Waterhouse
framework, and by raising the burden for employers asserting

186. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614 (West Supp. 1996); see
note 161.
187. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2614(a)(1).
188. 123 Congo Rec. 29,658 (1977).

supra
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the position-elimination defense. The author's recommendations would better achieve the goal of gender equality in the
workforce by expanding legal protection in federal law for
pregnant women.
1. Lowering the Plaintiff's Burden under the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Under the proposed amendment, the employee returning
from maternity leave will have a lower burden when asserting
her prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Under the second requirement that she had a satisfactory job
performance, the plaintiff who has been reincorporated into the
workforce will have an easier time meeting this burden because she has been working after her maternity leave. 189
Court~ could more easily recognize an employer with a hidden
discriminatory motive for firing an employee who was once
highly regarded and who continued to work at the same performance level after her return from maternity leave.
For example, consider an employee such as Kathy Smith,
an employee who received promotions and pay raises before requesting maternity leave and before vocalizing her intent to
become pregnant in the future. 19o If Smith had received her
job back after the leave she would have been able to continue
to perform at such a high level. Consequently, if Morse fired
her after her return, she would be armed with evidence of the
necessity of her position and her value as an employee.
2. Raising the Employer's Burden Under the Price Waterhouse
Framework
Under the proposed amendment, an employer will also
have to meet a higher burden under the Price Waterhouse
framework. Under Price Waterhouse, if the plaintiff can show
direct evidence of discrimination, the burden of persuasion

189. Smith, 76 F.3d at 430 (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico,
902 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir. 1990».
190. Smith, 76 F.3d at 418 (Smith received promotions and pay raises up to
twenty-five percent).
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shifts from employee to employer.191 The employer then has
the burden of affirmatively proving that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken the pregnancy into
account. 192
Again, consider an employee like Kathy Smith who was a
proven, valued employee before her maternity leave and who
vocalized her intention to become pregnant in the future. 193 If
Smith had returned to her job under this author's proposed
mandatory job protection period, Morse would have had difficulty proving that they fired her without regard to her pregnancy. The court would consider that Smith was working at
the same performance level before and after the leave. Furthermore, the fact finder would consider that she received
promotions and pay raises before the leave yet, while continuing to work at the same high level, was dismissed after the
leave. If a discriminatory motive was present, the 180 day job
protection period would uncover it for any fact finder to see.
3. Raising the Burden for Employers Asserting the PositionElimination Defense

The Smith case illustrates how easily an employer can
disguise a discriminatory motive by asserting the positionelimination defense. 194 An amendment allowing protection for
180 days commencing from the day a woman returns from
maternity leave would raise the employer's burden under the
position-elimination defense.
Usually some internal reorganization and work redistribution is necessary when a woman takes maternity leave. Under
the position-elimination defense, as indicated by the Smith
decision, the employer need only present evidence of this shuffling of tasks and simply cast it as mere coincidence in order to
show the company's imminent plans for reorganization. Such
easy perversion of the employer's intent under the positionelimination defense allows the employer to easily meet its burden.
191.
192.
193.
194.

[d. at 42l.
[d.
[d. at 418.
See supra parts IV.B. & IV.CA.
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This problem would not exist if the FMLA were expanded
to include this period of job protection. Once a woman returned
from her maternity leave, the employer would be required to
give her position, or a very similar position, back to her for at
least 180 days. Consequently, the employee returning from
maternity leave has resumed her normal job tasks. This
equalizes her position relative to other employees by bringing
her back to her status before the leave. The employee will have
the opportunity to demonstrate that she and her position are
valued thereby making the elimination of her position more
suspicious. Furthermore, if the employer still wishes to dismiss the returning woman he is faced with the difficulty and
high cost of training a new employee.
Also, this reorganization would take place when the woman is actually working for the employer not when she is absent
which would limit more terminations to only those involving
legitimate reorganization efforts. Once the statutory time period expires, it will be more difficult to reorganize without her
and more difficult to prove that her position would have been
eliminated without regard to her pregnancy.
As Justice Bownes stated, the majority's opinion, "could
erroneously be viewed as an invitation to use ... [the positionelimination] defense as a cover for discrimination against women who take or plan to take maternity leave.,,195 This added
protection will not shelter every woman who takes maternity
leave from discrimination, but it will expose more subtle incidents of discrimination which persist under the current laws.
As the Smith decision demonstrates, the employer's evidentiary burden under this defense is relatively low compared
to the plaintiffs burden, especially when the court refuses to
properly assess the validity of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
Absent strict adherence to Supreme Court precedent regarding
the initial factual inquiry, such a discrepancy creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs when an employer is
able to produce minimal evidence as to some legitimate business purpose for eliminating the position.

195. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429-30 (Bownes, J., concurring).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/4

30

Riede: Pregnancy Discrimination, Women's Law Forum

1997]

PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION

253

"In this case, if Smith had not become pregnant and taken
maternity leave, she would still be a valued Morse employee."l96
VII. CONCLUSION
If federal law provided Smith with job protection for 180
days past the time that she returned from maternity leave,
Smith would have been integrated back into the work place.
Therefore, Morse would have been less apt to fire Smith because it would have been more difficult and more costly to
bring in a new employee to complete her tasks. Alternatively,
if Morse still decided to dismiss Smith after the 180 period,
Smith would have met her burden of proving the prima facie
elements of discrimination in a subsequent lawsuit. In addition, it would have been much more difficult for Morse to assert the position-elimination defense. Smith would have returned to her position and would have demonstrated to Morse
that her work was of high caliber and worthy of respect and
recognition.

Smith is one of thousands of women who face discrimination after they return from maternity leave. Currently, our
laws do protect against blatant discrimination; however, they
do not prevent more subtle forms of discrimination from harming working mothers. With the modification to the FMLA set
out in this article, the power distribution between employer
and employee will be better balanced and pregnant women will
no longer be penalized for starting a family while working for a
living.

Victoria R. Riede'

196. Smith, at 76 F.3d at 436.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1998; B.A. Legal Studies,
University of California at Berkeley, 1994. I dedicate this comment to the best
teacher I know - my mother. Thank you for teaching me what strength and courage mean. I am particularly grateful to Craig M. Santa Maria for being a constant
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Batya Smernoff and Roberta Simon for their helpful comments.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

31

